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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: EMPLOYING 
THE “GREATEST LEGAL ENGINE EVER 
INVENTED FOR THE DISCOVERY OF TRUTH”1 
TO PROMOTE JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 
Ani Oganesian 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, two friends, Hull and Corzette, planned on attending a 
music festival together.2 They purchased three bags of heroin from 
Trent, a known dealer.3 They then picked up the bags from Land, one 
of Trent’s dealers, and headed to the music festival.4 At a nearby park, 
Hull cooked the heroin and Corzette injected it.5 When Corzette 
passed out, an unworried Hull returned to enjoy the musical 
festivities.6 When he later returned to the park, he found that Corzette 
was still passed out, with vomit on his clothes.7 Hull left Corzette in 
his car overnight “believing him to be fine.”8 The next day, Hull found 
Corzette dead in the car.9 
After some time, Hull contacted the police and cooperated with 
the officers to make an undercover purchase from Trent and Land, 
which led to their arrests.10 Eventually, Land pleaded guilty and 
 
 1. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ET AL., 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Business Management, 
Woodbury University. I wish to thank Professor Eric Miller for his invaluable guidance and 
teaching, the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their impeccable work, and 
my family and friends for their love and support. Special thanks to my husband for his unwavering 
encouragement throughout the writing process. 
 
 2. United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 701–02. 
 7. Id. at 702. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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agreed to testify with Hull against Trent at trial.11 Trent was charged 
with heroin distribution resulting in death, which carries a twenty-year 
minimum sentence.12 Trent’s defense counsel sought to impeach Hull 
and Land by exposing their desires to avoid  twenty-year minimum 
sentences by testifying.13 The district court found it sufficient to refer 
to the sentences as “substantial,” finding that any additional 
information would “improperly sway the jury’s decision in Trent’s 
case.”14 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
the cross-examination was “thorough” and “did not offend the core 
values of the Confrontation Clause.”15 This flawed line of reasoning, 
followed by the majority of United States circuit courts, disrupts the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants throughout the nation. 
The Sixth Amendment was passed by Congress on 
September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.16 It provides 
that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.17 
The Amendment serves an important mission: to protect the integrity 
of the “truth-determining process” in criminal proceedings.18 By 
virtue of this mission, the Confrontation Clause affords criminal 
defendants the “fundamental right” to cross-examine witnesses who 
testify against them.19 “Cross-examination is the principal means by 
 
 11. Id. at 703. 
 12. Id. at 702–03. Land and Hull also faced the same charge. Id. 
 13. Id. at 701, 703. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 706. Trent filed a petition for certiorari on December 8, 2017. United States v. Trent, 
863 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 8, 2017) (No. 17-830). 
 16. Stephanos Bibas & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Common Interpretation: The Sixth Amendment, 
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-vi (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 18. See Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
74, 89 (1970)). 
 19. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 101 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). 
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which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 
tested.”20 It is a procedural guarantee that enables defendants to 
challenge the government’s evidence. Thus, sufficient cross-
examination is especially important where the witness, who has been 
indicted himself, has agreed to testify pursuant to a cooperation 
agreement with the government.21 
In light of these concerns, U.S. courts have consistently discussed 
restrictions on the scope of cross-examination.22 But the Supreme 
Court has yet to address a critical issue: the extent to which criminal 
defendants may cross-examine witnesses about their cooperation 
agreements with the government. 
To determine the acceptable scope, it is important to understand 
the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause, how witnesses 
obtain cooperation agreements with the government, and the function 
that juries are historically meant to serve. Part II of this Note details 
the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Part III focuses 
on the government’s process of obtaining cooperation agreements in 
exchange for testimony. 
Part IV addresses the circuit split. Part IV.A discusses the 
minority approach adopted by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, 
which permits defendants to inquire into the specific sentences or 
charges that witnesses have avoided or hope to avoid by cooperating 
with the government.23 Part IV.B details the contrasting majority 
approach adopted by the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Eleventh circuits, which bars defendants from probing into the 
specifics of government witnesses’ agreements.24 Part V critiques the 
majority approach, focusing on how such limitations on cross-
examination deprive defendants of their confrontation rights and 
frustrate the jury’s ability to perform its function. Part VI proposes a 
bright-line rule allowing for liberal cross-examination of government 
witnesses about their cooperation agreements. 
 
 20. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 21. See United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1976) (“This right is especially 
important with respect to accomplices or other witnesses who may have substantial reason to 
cooperate with the government.”). 
 22. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (providing a list of decisions that reflect 
these two inquiries). 
 23. See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 24. Id. 
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II.  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A WALK THROUGH HISTORY 
A criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses was 
far from a novel idea when the founding fathers ratified the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution. It is a right that “‘comes to us on 
faded parchment’ with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of 
Western legal culture.”25 
A.  Confrontation Rights in Early Rome and England 
Defendants’ confrontation rights can be traced to Roman law. The 
beginnings of this right first appear in the fifth book of the New 
Testament, the Acts of the Apostles (“Acts”).26 Roman governor 
Festus explained in the Acts, “It is not the manner of the Romans to 
deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face 
to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against 
the charges.”27 
The right to confront an accuser was later incorporated as a 
procedural requirement of Roman criminal trial, as described in 
Cicero’s Verrine Orations (“Orations”).28 In Orations, Cicero writes 
about his prosecution of then-governor of Sicily, Gaius Verres, who 
was accused of misconduct in office.29 One such instance of 
misconduct alleged was when Verres sat as a judge in the prosecution 
of an accused, Sthenius, on two charges: forgery and a capital 
offense.30 Both trials were conducted without the presence of 
Sthenius, and the second trial was conducted without the presence of 
his accuser.31 Sthenius was found guilty at both trials.32 Cicero found 
that both convictions, made in Sthenius’s absence and in the absence 
of his accuser, were violations of the defendant’s rights.33 
Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 trial for charges of treason marks the 
touchstone for defendants’ confrontation rights in England.34 Raleigh 
 
 25. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted)). 
 26. Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval 
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 486 (1994). 
 27. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015–16 (quoting Acts 25:16). 
 28. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 26, at 486. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 481–82, 543. 
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was convicted primarily based upon the out-of-court testimony of his 
alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, which was read to the jury.35 
“[L]et Cobham be here,” Raleigh begged the judges, “Call my accuser 
before my face.”36 Raleigh argued that “false witnesses” could only be 
revealed by asking them questions.37 The judges denied Raleigh’s 
request, and he was sentenced to death.38 In the aftermath of Raleigh’s 
death, cross-examination of adverse witnesses became a facet of 
English common-law, which later provided the basis for the Sixth 
Amendment.39 
B.  Adoption of the Sixth Amendment 
The Federal Constitution, as originally proposed, did not account 
for confrontation rights.40 This omission was opposed by many, as it 
was seen as a shift back into English civil-law practices of the 
inquisitorial nature—namely, conducting pretrial examination in the 
absence of the defendant.41 Eventually, the Founders accounted for the 
omission by introducing the Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.42 
The Sixth Amendment was a means through which the Founders 
“sought to strengthen [the] vigorous adversarial process” and depart 
from the inquisitorial implications that its absence might have had on 
criminal trials.43 
The text of the Sixth Amendment and the recorded debates at the 
Constitutional Convention provide little guidance as to its underlying 
purpose.44 As a result, the Sixth Amendment, and particularly the 
Confrontation Clause, have been the focus of many cases before the 
Supreme Court. Confrontation Clause inquiries became even more 
prevalent after 1965, when the Court held in Pointer v. Texas45 that 
 
 35. Id. at 545. 
 36. Id. (alteration in original); see Mathew Lyons, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: A 
Transcript, WRITER & HISTORIAN (Nov. 18, 2011),  
https://mathewlyons.wordpress.com/2011/11/18/the-trial-of-sir-walter-ralegh-a-transcript/. 
 37. Lyons, supra note 36. 
 38. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 48 (2004). 
 39. Id. at 481–82. 
 40. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 49. 
 43. Bibas & Fisher, supra note 16. 
 44. Jonathan Clow, Throwing a Toy Wrench in the “Greatest Legal Engine”: Child Witnesses 
and the Confrontation Clause, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 796 (2015). 
 45. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
(6)51.4_OGANESIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2019  11:46 PM 
686 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:681 
the Sixth Amendment extends to states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 
Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has mainly involved 
two issues: “the admissibility of out-of-court statements” and 
“restrictions on the scope of cross-examination.”47 As the heart of this 
Note involves the latter inquiry, I will turn to an analysis of Supreme 
Court decisions which have helped define the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
C.  The Supreme Court Interpreting the Scope of the Confrontation 
Clause 
In order to determine the appropriate scope of cross-examining 
government witnesses about their cooperation agreements, it is 
essential to understand not only that cross-examination is an 
enumerated right conferred by the Confrontation Clause, but also why 
cross-examination is a constitutionally-protected right. Based upon an 
analysis of the historical underpinnings identified supra, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that a primary purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause is to ensure the “accuracy of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials.”48 As Justice Brown notably wrote in one of the earliest 
cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause: 
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause was] to 
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were 
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the 
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness, in which the accused has an 
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting 
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand 
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, 
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in 
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.49 
 
 46. Id. at 403. 
 47. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). 
 48. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (“[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause 
is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials 
by assuring that ‘the trier of fact (has) a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
[testimony].’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 
(1970)). 
 49. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (emphasis added). 
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This procedural guarantee of cross-examination allows 
defendants to “safeguard[] . . . the truth” by testing witnesses’ 
“veracity.”50 In essence, when witnesses are placed before a jury under 
oath, face-to-face with the defendant they are implicating, and are 
vigorously cross-examined by defense counsel with respect to their 
potential biases, two results are achieved: (1) witnesses are “more 
likely to testify truthfully;”51 and (2) the jury is better able to assess 
the full extent of witnesses’ credibility and prejudices towards the 
defendant.52 The jury’s assessment of witness credibility will, in turn, 
assist the jury in determining whether that particular testimony 
incriminates the defendant. 
Cross-examination is not an absolute right. It is limited, pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 611, to “the subject matter of the direct 
examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility.”53 Thus, 
defendants have “the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or 
that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable” by “delv[ing] into 
the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory . . . [to] 
impeach, i.e.,  discredit, the witness.”54 Limiting cross-examination is 
within the “broad discretion” of the trial judge,55 but “discretion in the 
area of bias evidence becomes operative only after the constitutionally 
required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the defendant.”56 
Two Supreme Court decisions have discussed “the scope of cross-
examination [of government witnesses] permitted” by trial courts and 
concluded that the limitations on cross-examination violated the 
defendants’ confrontation rights.57 In both cases, the Court found that 
the defendants’ inquiries were well within the permissible scope of 
cross-examination and served to reveal witnesses’ biases and 
credibility to the jury.58 
 
 50. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913). 
 51. Clow, supra note 44, at 798. 
 52. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 611(b). 
 54. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 
(1974). 
 55. See Marshall v. Walker, 464 U.S. 951, 952 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 56. Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (Pollak, J., dissenting). 
 57. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
 58. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 673. 
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1.  Davis v. Alaska 
The Supreme Court’s has stated that its decision in Davis v. 
Alaska59 exemplifies the scope of cross-examination.60 In Davis, the 
Court considered whether “the Confrontation Clause requires that a 
defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of 
a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias 
deriving from the witness’ probationary status.”61 
There, the defendant, Davis, was charged with stealing a safe 
containing cash and checks from a local bar.62 The safe was later found 
near Green’s home.63 Green became a key prosecution witness when 
he revealed, during interrogation at the police station, that he had seen 
a man near the area where the safe was found holding a crowbar.64 
Green later identified Davis in a line-up.65 
At the time Green testified to seeing Davis near his home, Green 
was on juvenile probation for having “burglarize[ed] two cabins.”66 
Prior to his testimony at trial, the prosecution sought a protective order 
to prevent mention of Green’s juvenile record.67 Defense counsel 
objected, arguing that any such mention would be necessary to reveal 
Green’s bias and prejudice, and demonstrate that he may have feared 
“possible jeopardy to his probation” when the safe was found near his 
home and “made a hasty and faulty identification of [Davis] to shift 
suspicion away from himself.”68 The trial court granted the protective 
order.69 
At trial, defense counsel questioned Green about whether he felt 
anxious that the police officers might have believed he was 
responsible for stealing the safe, given that it was found on his 
property.70 Green responded that he did not.71 The trial court did not 
 
 59. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
 60. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985). 
 61. Davis, 415 U.S. at 309. 
 62. Id. at 309–10. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 310. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 310–11. 
 67. Id. at 310. 
 68. Id. at 311. 
 69. Id. In doing so, the trial court relied upon Alaska state statutes, which provide that evidence 
of a minor’s juvenile status is not admissible. Id. 
 70. Id. at 312. 
 71. Id. at 313. 
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allow any further cross-examination into the matter, and Davis was 
ultimately convicted.72 
The Supreme Court reversed Davis’s convictions, finding 
violation of Davis’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.73 The 
Court reasoned that “[t]he accuracy and truthfulness of Green’s 
testimony were key elements in the State’s case against [Davis].”74 
The defense sought to admit Green’s juvenile record to allow the jury 
to make the inference that Green may have been biased because he 
was concerned about being a possible suspect and because of his 
probationary status.75 The Court found that Green’s entitlement to 
“testify free from embarrassment and with his reputation unblemished 
must fall before the right of [Davis] to seek out the truth in the process 
of defending himself.”76 
The Court further opined that cross-examination is “‘not for the 
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness.’ . . . [It] is the principal means 
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony 
are tested.”77 One way to reveal the truth of such a witness’s testimony 
is to explore his “partiality” using questioning that may “reveal[] 
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives . . . as they may relate 
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”78 The Court 
noted that without further questioning, the jury had no understanding 
of why Green might have been biased and any such suggestion by the 
defense would have appeared “speculative.”79 Finally, the Court found 
that the State’s interest in protecting Green’s juvenile record “cannot 
require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness.”80 
The Davis Court’s language accentuates the bedrock principle of 
the Confrontation Clause: cross-examination is a procedural right that 
affords defendants the opportunity to reveal witnesses’ ulterior 
motives and prejudices.81 This ruling provides that a trial court abuses 
 
 72. Id. at 313–14. 
 73. Id. at 315. 
 74. Id. at 317. 
 75. Id. at 317–18. 
 76. Id. at 320. 
 77. Id. at 316 (quoting 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ET AL., EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 940 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 318. 
 80. Id. at 320. 
 81. Id. at 316. 
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its discretion when it limits inquiry aimed at exposing witness 
credibility even if the questioning has already revealed some potential 
bias.82 Probing a witness about facts that would make him more or less 
likely to testify without the “impartiality expected of a witness at 
trial”83 is necessary for the defense to develop its theory of bias in full. 
Moreover, the Court’s finding that “the right of confrontation is 
paramount”84 to the State’s statutory protection of juvenile offenders 
suggests that a defendant’s right to cross-examine an adverse witness 
with respect to his credibility is a supreme right which can seldom be 
disturbed. 
2.  Delaware v. Van Arsdall 
Over a decade later, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,85 the Supreme 
Court was faced with a closely-related issue: whether defense counsel 
was inappropriately prohibited from cross-examining a prosecution 
witness about his agreement to testify “in exchange for the dismissal 
of an unrelated criminal charge against him.”86 
There, Van Arsdall was convicted of stabbing Epps to death in 
her apartment following a New Year’s Eve party.87 Fleetwood, who 
was staying in a neighboring apartment, testified at trial.88 He 
“recount[ed] uncontroverted facts about the party” and stated that he 
saw Van Arsdall sitting in Epps’s apartment from the doorway.89 
In exchange for Fleetwood’s testimony at trial, the prosecution 
dismissed a pending, unrelated public drunkenness charge against 
him.90 During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted, to no 
avail, to elicit information about the charge to expose Fleetwood’s 
motivation for testifying.91 Instead, the judge allowed cross-
examination about the charge to occur “outside the presence of the 
jury.”92 
 
 82. Id. at 318. 
 83. Id. at 318. 
 84. Id. at 319. 
 85. 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
 86. Id. Van Arsdall is the only time that the Court has specifically discussed whether 
confrontation rights are violated when a trial court limits cross-examination of a government 
witness’s cooperation agreement. 
 87. Id. at 674. 
 88. Id. at 675. 
 89. Id. at 675. 
 90. Id. at 676. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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The Court found that the trial court had violated Van Arsdall’s 
confrontation rights, providing that “the exposure of a witness’ 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”93 The Court 
recognized the wide discretion a trial court has in limiting cross-
examination due to basic concerns such as “harassment, prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant.”94 
However, the Court found that insofar as “all inquiry” into 
Fleetwood’s possible bias was limited, the jury was denied the chance 
to consider his “motive for favoring the prosecution in his 
testimony.”95 In concluding, the Court proposed the following: 
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the 
Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited 
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of 
the witness, and thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from 
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating 
to the reliability of the witness.”96 
As Van Arsdall and Davis provide, cross-examination guarantees 
defendants the right to reveal witnesses’ biases (no matter how 
marginal they may be), essentially equipping the jury with a tool for 
assessing the credibility and weight to afford those witnesses’ 
testimonies. While cross-examination may be limited, these opinions 
and the history of the Confrontation Clause dictate that exposing a 
cooperating witness’s motive for testifying against a criminal 
defendant is a primary and significant component of the constitutional 
right to confront. 
III.  SECURING COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: NO CEILING ON 
GOVERNMENT DISCRETION 
Cooperating co-defendants often serve as key and sometimes sole 
witnesses against defendants in criminal proceedings, particularly in 
 
 93. Id. at 678–79 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 315, 316–17 (1974)). Dissenting on other 
grounds, Justice Marshall maintained that cross-examination is such an important right, and that 
the denial of that right should have resulted in the reversal of Van Arsdall’s conviction entirely. Id. 
at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 679 (majority opinion). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 
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drug cases.97 This practice carries with it a dangerous reality: such 
testimony is often replete with fabrication and/or exaggeration due to 
the witnesses’ incentives to “please” the government.98 This section 
will discuss a simplified process of how the government obtains 
witnesses, and the problems posed by this process. 
A.  How Defendants Become Cooperating Witnesses 
Obtaining witnesses to testify against a defendant in exchange for 
cooperation agreements is a two-part process that engages the 
investigator and the prosecutor.99 The process involves the extensive 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and control, which injects inherent 
bias into the witnesses’ ultimate testimony.100 Cooperating witnesses 
often have one primary goal: to comply with the government’s 
requests in hopes of a beneficial deal,101 thereby raising the concern 
that such testimony may be biased, exaggerated, and sometimes even 
untruthful. As such, the process has been critiqued by legal scholars 
as being “unjust, corrupt, and undemocratic.”102 
1.  Role of the Investigator 
Investigating officers or agents typically engage in the first 
contact with potential witnesses, as they are responsible for arrests and 
investigations, and they have “the most information about and 
influence over [potential witnesses].”103 Investigators “recruit” 
witnesses in various ways.104 The most common method is to offer an 
arrested individual the opportunity to “mitigate his situation” by 
providing certain information and cooperating with the arresting 
officer.105 Investigators may also arrest an individual that has 
committed a particular crime for the purpose of turning him into an 
informant.106 “Informed bluff[ing]” is another method utilized.107 In 
 
 97. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 46 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 22. 
 99. Id. at 17–18. 
 100. Id. at 49–50. 
 101. See id. at 22. 
 102. See ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 143 
(2012). 
 103. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 18. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
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this method, an investigator allows an individual to believe that there 
is an indictable case against him, but in reality, the investigator has not 
produced enough evidence for a prosecutor to press charges.108 
Afraid of the possibility of being charged, such individuals often 
agree to comply with officers’ requests.109 Illegal methods are also 
employed. For example, officers may target a potential witness (who 
they know is prone to criminal activity) and wait until he commits a 
crime to arrest him.110 They then propose a favorable deal to him in 
exchange for his cooperation.111 Although police and investigators do 
not have the authority to induce official cooperation agreements, they 
may make promises that the prosecutor will.112 
2.  Role of the Prosecutor 
The prosecutor’s practice of obtaining plea bargains with 
defendants was never “voted upon by state or federal 
legislatures[,] . . . emerged with very little scrutiny,” and essentially 
“sidelines” the judge, allowing prosecutors to take “center stage.”113 
Prosecutors have the sole discretion to press charges against arrested 
individuals.114 Prosecutors also have the power to alter or drop 
criminal charges against individuals in exchange for their 
cooperation.115 This charging power is “unreviewable by courts,” 
except in the rare instance when there is reason to believe the 
“prosecutor has charged someone on an impermissible basis such as 
race, vindictiveness, or to punish the defendant for exercising his 
constitutional rights.”116 In addition, prosecutors may recommend 
lenient and reduced sentencing to a trial judge.117 Judges are highly 
deferential to prosecutors’ recommendations and rely heavily upon 
“the government’s substantial assistance motion” and “evaluation of 
the assistance received” in making sentencing determinations.118 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 18–19. 
 111. Id. at 19. 
 112. Id. at 48. 
 113. DZUR, supra note 102, at 144–45. 
 114. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 49. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 50. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Brian A. Jacobs, et al., Navigating the Cooperation Process in a Federal White Collar 
Criminal Investigation, PRACTICAL LAW 8 (2017), 
https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2017-04-20-navigating-the-cooperation-process-
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When confronted with multiple defendants involved in a 
particular crime, prosecutors apply a “utilitarian calculation, whereby 
the relative dangerousness and culpability of each defendant is 
evaluated.”119 This calculation results in a determination of whom to 
prosecute and whom to offer a deal in exchange for his incriminating 
testimony against the other.120 
Two types of general agreements may be arranged with 
cooperating witnesses: cooperation agreements and immunity 
orders.121 Immunized witnesses “typically face no criminal liability” 
in exchange for their testimony.122 Conversely, witnesses who testify 
pursuant to cooperation agreements are still prosecuted for their role 
in the criminal offense, but are promised leniency (typically altered or 
dropped charges, or a reduced sentence recommendation to the judge) 
in exchange for their testimony.123 The cooperation agreement 
essentially operates as a bilateral contract.124 The extent to which a 
cooperating witness’s duty is considered fulfilled pursuant to the 
agreement largely depends upon the prosecutor’s determination of the 
“quality or utility of the witness’ testimony.”125 
Only after determining that the witness’s testimony was 
satisfactory is the government required to perform its end of the 
bargain.126 Such “contingent plea agreements” have been consistently 
upheld by courts.127 Consequently, if a prosecutor determines that the 
witness’s testimony was not particularly incriminating, she may refuse 
to afford the witness the benefit of the deal in its entirety. This 
 
in-a-federal-white-collar-criminal-investigation/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Navigating%20the 
%20Cooperation%20Process%20in%20a%20Federal%20White%20Collar%20Criminal%20In....
pdf. 
 119. Spencer Martinez, Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Exchange 
for Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 144 (1999). 
 120. See id.  
 121. Robert R. Strang, Plea Bargaining, Cooperation Agreements, and Immunity Orders, 
155TH INT’L TRAINING COURSE VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS, 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No92/No92_05VE_Strang1.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Martinez, supra note 119, at 148. 
 125. Id. at 149. 
 126. Id. at 148–49. 
 127. Id. at 149–50 (citing United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 
1977)). 
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“pressure on the witness to please is extreme” and, thus, creates a 
“plausible risk that the witness will commit perjury to do it.”128 
The investigator’s tactical approach to securing witnesses, 
coupled with the prosecutor’s wide discretion and power in charging 
individuals or recommending reduced sentences triggers many 
important concerns. First, it results in disproportionate sentencing.129 
Defendants who commit the same crime may receive significantly 
different penalties.130 This disproportionality undercuts the “important 
civic interest in having public inquiry and adjudication” of criminal 
offenses.131 As a result, criminal jurisprudence suffers.132 
In addition to disproportionate sentencing, there is unequal 
bargaining power between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor who 
has the power to single-handedly change or, at the very least, 
significantly influence a defendant’s penalty under the law. These 
issues are particularly concerning when courts prohibit cross-
examination of cooperating witnesses regarding the details of their 
dealings with the prosecutor.133 
How truthful will such witnesses be on the stand when faced with 
the strong incentive to “please” the prosecutor to ensure that they 
obtain what they have bargained for? How likely is it that a 
cooperating witness will minimize his own role in the crime, shifting 
the entire blame onto the defendant? These questions are best left for 
the jury to assess, equipped with all the facts necessary in making such 
a determination. 
B.  Cooperating Witness Testimony: True or False? 
[E]ach contract for testimony is fraught with the real peril 
that the proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply 
factually contrived to “get” a target of sufficient interest to 
induce concessions from the government. . . .  
 
 128. Martinez, supra note 119, at 149. 
 129. DZUR, supra note 102, at 144. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 145 (quoting John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The 
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 124 (1992)). 
 132. See DZUR, supra note 102, at 145. 
 133. The unequal bargaining power of prosecutors and defendants and the disproportionate 
sentencing that results from cooperation agreements are beyond the scope of this Note. However, 
these issues underscore the many problems with prosecutorial discretion and how the limitation on 
cross-examination of government witnesses becomes even more problematic when considering that 
unfettered discretion. 
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[R]ewarded criminals [] represent a great threat to the 
mission of the criminal justice system.134 
Cooperating witnesses have “predictable and powerful 
inducements to lie.”135 In fact, with liberty and sometimes even life at 
stake, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie.”136 Justice 
Ginsburg has noted that the “Court has long recognized the ‘serious 
questions of credibility’ informers pose.”137 
In her book, Snitching, former Assistant Federal Public Defender 
Alexandra Natapoff explores this issue by tracing several studies 
which reveal the extent of cooperating witnesses’ false testimonies.138 
A study conducted by Northwestern Law School’s Center on 
Wrongful Convictions in 2004 indicated that 45.9 percent of wrongful 
capital convictions hinged on untruthful informant testimony.139 
University of Michigan Law School professor Samuel Gross’s studies 
showed that close to “50 percent of wrongful murder convictions 
involved perjury” by witnesses “who stood to gain from the false 
testimony.”140 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Trott has compared the use 
of cooperating witnesses against other criminals to a scalpel—“a 
marvelous tool . . . [that] can remove a deadly tumor or repair a 
diseased heart.”141 He warned, however, that “as in the case of a 
scalpel, the careless, unskilled, or unprepared use of cooperating 
criminal as a witness has the capacity to backfire so severely that an 
otherwise solid case becomes irreparably damaged.”142 Judge Trott 
has noted that one such damaging aspect is the untruthful cooperating 
witness: 
Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get 
what they want, especially when what they want is to get out 
 
 134. Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 135. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 70. 
 136. Id. (quoting United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
 137. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701 (2004) (citing On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 
757 (1952)). 
 138. See NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 69–81. 
 139. Id. at 70. 
 140. Id. (citing Samuel R. Gross et. al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543–44 (2005)). For a more comprehensive illustration of the 
studies conducted, see NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76–78. 
 141. Stephen S. Trott, The Use of a Criminal as a Witness: A Special Problem, 
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION LECTURE SUPPLEMENT 1 (Oct. 2007) 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/informant_trott_outline.pdf. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
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of trouble with the law. This willingness to do anything 
includes not only truthfully spilling the beans on friends and 
relatives, but also lying, committing perjury, manufacturing 
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more 
lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into 
contact, including the prosecutor.143 
Take, for example, the story of Marion “Mad Dog” Pruett.144 
Pruett began his criminal career in 1971 when he robbed a bank.145 In 
1975, he was imprisoned in Atlanta for a subsequent bank robbery.146 
While in prison, he killed his cellmate, blamed it on another inmate, 
and testified against him.147 In exchange for his testimony, which 
resulted in the conviction of the innocent inmate, the government 
released him through the Federal Witness Protection Program.148 
Pruett then began a murderous rampage through the country, killing 
four people.149 He later admitted that he had also killed his cellmate 
and that his testimony against the convicted inmate had been a lie.150 
Courts have repeatedly overturned convictions due to 
determinations that government witnesses had fabricated their 
testimonies.151 In United States v. D’Angelo,152 the district court 
granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for a murder 
conviction after finding that three of the government’s key 
cooperating witnesses, the defendant’s accomplices, had provided 
false testimony.153 Specifically, the accomplices lied about their own 
involvement in the murder, as well as the circumstances of how the 
murder had occurred.154 One of the accomplices even had a “sordid 
history of perjury and subornation of perjury, of which the government 
was aware.”155 
 
 143. Id. at 5. 
 144. Id. at 5–6. 
 145. Execution Set for ‘Mad Dog’ Pruett, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (Apr. 11, 1999), 
http://amarillo.com/stories/041199/tex_227-1142.shtml#.WqNvsBpwZol. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
D’Angelo, No. 02 CR 399(JG), 2004 WL 315237 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004). 
 152. No. 02 CR 399 (JG), 2004 WL 315237 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004). 
 153. Id. at *1. 
 154. Id. at *16–18. 
 155. Id. at *19. 
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In Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie,156 the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the defendant’s convictions because the prosecution failed to 
investigate a possible conspiracy among the accomplice witnesses to 
testify against the defendant untruthfully.157 There, a group of men 
were arrested in connection with a murder.158 Most of the group agreed 
to “full cooperation” with the prosecution and to give “truthful 
testimony” against the defendant, Bowie.159 The promises given in 
exchange for their testimonies ranged from probation to pleading 
guilty to charges lesser than murder, which carried nine-year 
sentences.160 
At trial, the witnesses “collectively paint[ed] an evidentiary 
picture of Bowie’s personal responsibility for [the victim’s] death,” 
and Bowie was convicted of premeditated murder and kidnapping.161 
At trial, Bowie introduced evidence of a letter that was found in one 
of the witness’s jail cells that read as follows: 
Hey brod I want you to help me please for this problem that 
were facing right now because if they know that Im the one 
that did this theyre gonna put me in jail for life. I tried this 
before. Brah this Is what we gonna do listen carefully okay 
if we go to court on Thursday and they ask us questions how 
the murder happens and who kill the philipino just say J.J. 
because I already talk to John and Brasslley before I was 
arrested but anyway don’t worry about Lucas because I talk 
to Lucas that don’t tell the detectives that Im the one that did 
this things. 
You know what brah, don’t worry about this case because 
well win this just imagine four against one I I even lied to my 
lawyer about the incedent.162 
Although the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the case had 
been notified of the letter, he had instructed the Sergeant “not to do 
anything with the letter, just to keep it until” it was needed.163 
 
 156. 243 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 157. Id. at 1111. 
 158. Id. at 1112. 
 159. Id. at 1113. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1113. 
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These examples, and many more, portray the inherent danger that 
exists in allowing cooperating government witnesses to testify against 
a criminal defendant. Undoubtedly, cooperating witnesses have been 
and continue to be crucial in providing meaningful and necessary 
testimony, particularly in cases where no other evidence exists.164 But 
in order to ensure that defendants are afforded their confrontation 
rights and are able to expose these potential biases, juries must be 
given full disclosure. 
In most jurisdictions, judges inform the jury that a witness has 
cooperated with the government and is obtaining some benefit in 
exchange for his testimony.165 Some even invite the jury to carefully 
scrutinize such testimony.166 These are steps in the right direction, but 
there is more that the criminal justice system can accomplish—starting 
with expanding the scope of cross-examination. 
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 
The foregoing analysis raises the following questions: Do the 
details of a witness’s plea deal speak to his credibility? Or is it 
sufficient to simply know that the witness has cooperated in some way 
with the government in exchange for his testimony? A majority of 
U.S. courts have answered the latter question in the affirmative. In 
doing so, these courts have found that informing the jury that a witness 
is cooperating with the government is sufficient and have limited any 
further inquiry into the details of the cooperation. On the other hand, 
the minority of U.S. courts have held that specific cross-examination 
of witnesses about their agreements with the government is necessary 
in some circumstances. 
A.  The Majority Approach 
The majority approach is as follows: the cross-examination of 
witnesses about their agreements with the government should be 
 
 164. Martinez, supra note 119, at 142 (“In spite of advances in scientific and statistical 
evidence, the success of a criminal prosecution continues to hinge primarily on witness testimony. 
Such evidence is difficult to come by, especially in the case of more sophisticated criminals or 
defendants who commit crimes through syndicates that insulate them from the relevant actus 
reus.”). 
 165. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76. 
 166. Id.; see Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Eleventh 
Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) (2016), 
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstructio
ns2016Rev.pdf. 
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limited to avoid jury confusion and nullification.167 These courts have 
found that revealing the witnesses’ specific penalties and sentences are 
not probative in exposing witness bias.168 
The First Circuit has held that any value that an inquiry into the 
“precise number of years” that a witness may avoid by testifying is 
“outweighed by the potential for prejudice by having the jury learn 
what penalties the defendants were facing.”169 In United States v. 
Luciano-Mosquera,170 the defendants faced various charges 
surrounding “a scheme to smuggle cocaine into Puerto Rico.”171 In 
exchange for defendant Castillo-Ramos’s testimony against defendant 
Pagan-San-Miguel, the prosecution dropped a firearms charge against 
Castillo-Ramos.172 During cross-examination at trial, Pagan-San-
Miguel’s defense counsel asked Castillo-Ramos if he was aware that 
he would have faced a thirty-five-year sentence had the firearms 
charge not been dropped.173 The district court sustained an objection 
to the question.174 The Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court’s action, finding that although exposing the biases of witnesses 
is important, the jury could have made “a discriminating appraisal of 
the possible biases and motivations of the witnesses” without this 
particular inquiry.175 
In line with the First Circuit’s reasoning, the Second, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that where defense counsel has had the 
chance to elicit testimony about witnesses’ cooperation with the 
government and expectations of reduced sentences, detailed cross-
examination about the “specific penalties at stake” is impermissible.176 
The Fourth Circuit has voiced the concern that “the jury might 
‘nullify’ its verdict if it knew the extreme penalties faced by the 
[defendants]” in a case where the witnesses faced the same charges as 
the defendant.177 Specifically, the court found “that if the jury could 
 
 167. United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 168. Id. at 843–44. 
 169. United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 170. 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 171. Id. at 1146–48. 
 172. Id. at 1153. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. (quoting Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 176. United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 1997); see United States v. Rushin, 
844 F.3d 933, 940 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Reid, 300 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 177. Cropp, 127 F.3d at 358. 
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infer the very long sentences faced by the [defendants] from knowing 
the sentences faced by the co-conspirators, the jury members would 
hesitate to find the [defendants] guilty even if the evidence proved 
their guilt.”178 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently disagreed with a 
defendant’s contention that the jury couldn’t make a “discriminating 
appraisal” of the witnesses’ biases without knowing the exact length 
of the mandatory minimum sentence he faced absent cooperation.179 
The district court did not permit the defendant to introduce to the jury 
that the witness was facing a twenty-year minimum sentence, although 
it did allow the defendant to refer to the sentence as “substantial.”180 
The Eighth Circuit has held similarly. In United States v. 
Walley,181 the district court did not permit defense counsel to ask the 
cooperating witness about his forty-year maximum sentence or his 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence, finding that this was a way 
to reveal to the jury the possible sentences that the defendant faced.182 
The district court did, however, allow defense counsel to indicate that 
the witness faced a “significant sentence.”183 The Court of Appeals 
held that informing the jury that the witness faced a possible five-year 
sentence as opposed to calling the sentence “significant,” would not 
have given the jury a “significantly different impression” of the 
witness’s credibility.184 
B.  The Minority Approach 
A minority of U.S. Circuit Courts have held that inquiry into the 
details of a cooperating witness’s agreement with the government is 
necessary to expose to the jury potential biases and afford defendants 
their confrontation rights.185 
1.  The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court’s wide discretion in 
limiting cross-examination is, in turn, limited “by the requirements of 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 180. Id. 
 181. 567 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 182. Id. at 359. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 360. 
 185. United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
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the Sixth Amendment.”186 Recognizing the importance of exposing 
cooperating witnesses’ potential biases, the court has reversed rulings 
which have prevented the disclosure of information related to 
witnesses’ efforts to avoid the penalties they would face in the absence 
of cooperation with the government.187 
In United States v. Landerman,188 five defendants challenged 
their ability to cross-examine a government witness about pending 
felony charges in state court.189 The witness had pleaded guilty to two 
counts of fraud in federal court related to the defendants’ charges, and 
had an unrelated pending drug charge in state court.190 
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked the 
witness whether he believed the government would make a favorable 
recommendation to the state prosecutor in exchange for his 
cooperation in the federal case.191 The district court barred the 
admission of this testimony into evidence, finding that it was unduly 
prejudicial.192 The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that “the jury, 
as the trier of fact, should have been allowed to draw its own 
inferences regarding [the witness’s] credibility and determine what 
effect, if any, the pending criminal charge had on [his] motivation to 
testify.”193 
2.  The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit has made similar rulings. In United States v. 
Chandler,194 the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.195 The defendant’s co-
conspirators pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government to 
testify against her at trial.196 Defense counsel attempted to solicit 
information about the witnesses’ sentence reductions and agreements 
 
 186. United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. 
Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1468 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 101; United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 188. 109 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 189. Id. at 1061. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1062. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 326 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 195. Id. at 212. 
 196. Id. at 213. 
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with the government.197 However, the district court “substantially 
restricted” defense counsel’s efforts to do so.198 
The first witness, Sylvester, had dealt about five kilos of cocaine, 
but was charged with only a three-ounce sale in exchange for his 
cooperation with the government.199 During cross-examination, 
Sylvester testified “that he could have been charged for trafficking in 
much larger quantities” than the three ounces that he was ultimately 
charged for.200 The second witness, Yearwood, had pleaded guilty to 
trafficking anywhere from fifteen to fifty pounds of cocaine.201 
Yearwood had not yet been sentenced at the time of the defendant’s 
trial, but testified that she hoped her sentence would be reduced for 
agreeing to testify against the defendant.202 The district court denied 
defense counsel the opportunity to ask the witnesses what sentences 
they had avoided and hoped to avoid in exchange for cooperating with 
the government.203 
The Third Circuit found that the jury would have received a 
“significantly different impression” of Chandler’s co-conspirators had 
her counsel been permitted to expose the “magnitude” of their 
potential sentence reductions.204 The court concluded that excluding 
information about these reductions, which would “expose to the jury 
the facts from which [they] . . . could appropriately draw inferences” 
about the co-conspirators’ credibility, violated the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.205 The court acknowledged that 
exposing the jury to information about the witnesses’ potential 
sentences could lead to nullification, but found that nullification is 
outweighed by the defendant’s right to cross-examine.206 
3.  The Ninth Circuit 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit followed this line of reasoning 
in an en banc decision, finding constitutional error when the district 
court disallowed defense counsel to explore a cooperating witness’s 
 
 197. Id. at 216. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 216–17. 
 200. Id. at 217. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 218. 
 204. Id. at 222. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 223. 
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mandatory minimum life sentence.207 In United States v. Larson,208 
four defendants—Poitra, Lamere, Larson, and Laverdure—were each 
charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute methamphetamine.209 Poitra and Lamere pleaded guilty and 
agreed to cooperate with the government.210 In light of his two prior 
felony drug convictions, Lamere faced a mandatory minimum 
sentence of life without the possibility of release.211 Poitra faced a 
mandatory minimum of five years.212 
The district court shut down defense counsel’s attempts to solicit 
information about the witnesses’ respective mandatory sentences.213 
The Ninth Circuit held that the restriction of Poitra’s cross-
examination about her five-year mandatory minimum was warranted 
and did not violate the defendants’ confrontation rights because 
defense counsel had a chance to “adequately explore [her] motivation 
to lie.”214 In contrast, inquiring into Lamere’s mandatory minimum 
life sentence “would [have] reveal[ed] to the jury Lamere’s potential 
biases and motivations for testifying against [the] Defendants,” and 
therefore contained significant probative value.215 The Court further 
explained that: 
The potential maximum statutory sentence that a cooperating 
witness might receive, however, is fundamentally different 
from the mandatory minimum sentence that the 
witness will receive in the absence of a motion by the 
Government. The former lacks significant probative force 
because a defendant seldom receives the maximum penalty 
permissible under the statute of conviction. In contrast, the 
fact that here a cooperating witness faced a mandatory life 
sentence without the possibility of release in the absence of 
a government motion is highly relevant to the witness’ 
credibility. It is a sentence that the witness knows with 
certainty that he will receive unless he satisfies the 
 
 207. United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 208. 495 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 209. Id. at 1097. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1099. 
 214. Id. at 1103. 
 215. Id. at 1104. 
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government with substantial and meaningful cooperation so 
that it will move to reduce his sentence.216 
V.  LIMITING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES 
LIMITS JURIES’ ROLES AND DEFENDANTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
 [E]specially broad latitude should be afforded the questioning of 
an accomplice now acting as a government witness which concerns 
“the nature of any agreement he has with the government or any 
expectation or hope that he will be treated leniently in exchange for 
his cooperation.”217 
The underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause together 
with the means and methods by which the government obtains 
cooperating witnesses leads to the following conclusion: the majority 
view is severely flawed. First, limiting extensive cross-examination of 
witnesses’ cooperation agreements prevents the jury from adequately 
assessing the magnitude of witnesses’ biases and credibility. Second, 
district courts place these limitations without a proper application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that a “court may 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . prejudice.”218 This results in a 
conclusory declaration that jury nullification is a substantial risk that 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Finally, these 
limitations violate criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights. 
The following sections will explain why the majority’s approach 
infringes on defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights, and how jury 
nullification is a trivial concern that is substantially outweighed by the 
probative value of cooperation agreement evidence. 
A.  Jury Nullification: The Lesser of Two Evils 
The majority has voiced the concern that when juries are 
informed of the specific sentences witnesses have avoided or hope to 
avoid by testifying, they attribute those sentences to the defendant and 
nullify as a result.219 These courts’ decisions to limit cross-
 
 216. Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted). 
 217. United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 218. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 219. See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
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examination rest largely upon this proposition. However, the courts 
fail to account for a host of questions that accompany such a broad 
statement. What factors in a criminal case account for jury 
nullification? And most importantly, how often do those factors 
actually contribute to nullification? 
Multiple studies have shown that jury nullification is not as 
common as critics contend.220 A study conducted by scholars at the 
National Center for State Courts gathered data from 372 felony jury 
trials in the Bronx, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Washington D.C.221 
The data revealed that the jury nullified in only 0.5 percent of the cases 
in which there was strong prosecution evidence but “low juror 
perceptions of legal fairness,” and in only 2 percent of the cases in 
which there was ambiguous evidence.222 An Oxford University study 
of more than 300 jury trials concluded that juries generally acquit due 
to the prosecution’s failure “to provide enough information or to 
present it in court in a way that would convince” the jury “of the 
defendant’s guilt.”223 Thus, it appears that the driving force behind 
jury nullification is the prosecution’s flawed case presentation. 
Jury nullification exists despite strong evidence of guilt, but is 
“limited and principled.”224 For example, juries may nullify when 
“defendants are arrested for protesting an immoral war, physically 
disabling a would-be murderer, or assisting the suicide of a terminally 
ill patient.”225 Juries also nullify where a case “involve[s] a serious 
offense, a young victim, and an unemployed defendant.”226 Even so, 
those “deviations [are] not excessive[,] . . . widespread, nor 
routine.”227 
What is more, courts have at their disposal various methods by 
which to prevent or mitigate the risk of nullification. For example, 
judges may provide an instruction that “the jury must impartially apply 
and follow the law, no matter what.”228 Courts may also prohibit 
 
 220. DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 70–71 (2012). 
 221. Id. at 71. 
 222. Id. 
 223. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 154 (1986). 
 224. Id. 
 225. DEVINE, supra note 220, at 69. 
 226. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 223, at 154. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2014) (citing Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law 
Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 56 (1997)). 
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counsel from making any mention of a jury’s right to nullify in closing 
arguments.229 Extensive voir dire examination to filter jurors likely to 
engage in nullification is also a viable option.230 
Additionally, as further discussed in Part V.B, infra, principled 
nullification is sometimes necessary and fulfills the jury’s democratic 
function in acting as a check on the government. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has found “that when juries differ with the result at which the 
judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some 
of the very purposes for which they were created.”231 Thus, the 
majority’s concern that comprehensive cross-examination of 
witnesses’ cooperation agreements results in jury nullification is 
without merit. 
B.  Probative Value & The Jury’s Dual Function 
 “The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary 
power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the 
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor 
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or 
biased response of a judge.”232 
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants another vital 
guarantee: the right to a jury trial.233 Juries are meant to perform both 
communitarian and democratic functions.234 As representatives of the 
public, juries “participate in the administration of justice”235 by 
carrying the “shared responsibility” of determining a criminal 
defendant’s “guilt or innocence.”236 This determination rests heavily 
upon weighing the credibility and potential biases of testifying 
witnesses. In fact, jury deliberation is one of the most critical methods 
through which witness credibility is tested.237 
 
 229. Id. (citing Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench 
and Bar, 173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 89–94 (2002)). 
 230. Id. at 1111 (citing Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1997)). 
 231. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968). 
 232. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 234. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as a Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 830 (2015). 
 235. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991). 
 236. Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 
87 (1970)). 
 237. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). 
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The Supreme Court declared that the right to a jury trial is 
“granted . . . in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”238 As 
a democracy, criminal juries provide “indispensable protection against 
the possibility of governmental oppression.”239 Serving on a jury 
instills in the public a “conscious duty” to “guard the rights” of parties 
and “prevent [the] arbitrary use or abuse” of the criminal justice 
system.240 Juries provide a “safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.”241 At its core, a criminal jury makes “judicial or prosecutorial 
unfairness less likely.”242 
A government witness that poses the danger of providing 
unreliable testimony is the prime example of a threat that juries are 
meant to police.243 Courts alert juries to the possibility of untruthful 
witnesses. For example, the Ninth Circuit model instructions provide 
that “the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case . . . the witness’s 
bias or prejudice . . . [and] any other factors that bear on believability” 
should be considered in giving weight to testimony.244 Similarly, the 
Sixth Circuit model instructions urge the jury to consider whether “the 
witness had any relationship to the government or the defendant, or 
anything to gain or lose from the case . . . any bias, or prejudice, or 
reason for testifying that might cause the witness to lie or slant the 
testimony in favor of one side or the other.”245 
Moreover, juries are often advised to “consider . . . with more 
caution” testimony where the witness has immunity or is an 
 
 238. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). 
 239. Brown, 447 U.S. at 330 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 87) (“[T]he concept of relying on a 
body of one’s peers to determine guilt or innocence [is] a safeguard against arbitrary law 
enforcement.”). 
 240. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406–07 (citation omitted); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 
(1922). 
 241. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
 242. Id. at 158; see also Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About 
Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1995) (“Supreme Court 
jurisprudence demonstrates that jury-control practices that seek to limit the jury’s role to mere 
factfinder . . . [are] impermissible in the criminal context if they interfere with the jury’s political 
function under the Sixth Amendment as buffer against potential governmental abuses.”). 
 243. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 76 (“[T]he jury remains one of the American system’s most 
important checks on informant reliability.”). 
 244. Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions Committee, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions 
for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit 8 (Dec. 2017), http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-
instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Criminal_Instructions_2017_12.pdf. 
 245. Sixth Circuit Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions (Dec. 20. 2017), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/pattern_jury/
pdf/crmpattjur_full.pdf. 
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accomplice or codefendant with a cooperation agreement.246 Judges 
even inform the jury that such witnesses “may have a reason to make 
a false statement in order to strike a good bargain with the 
Government.”247 
Notwithstanding these guidelines, the majority of U.S. courts still 
decline to provide the jury with the tools necessary to properly conduct 
such a cautionary assessment. For a jury to fully determine the 
magnitude of a particular witness’s credibility and bias, it must be 
supplied with all information with which it can make an informed-
decision. And if a jury is to combat “judicial or prosecutorial 
unfairness,”248 revealing a witness’s cooperation agreement with the 
government provides a crucial method in doing so. Thus, it defeats 
logic to assume that information about witnesses’ sentence reductions 
or charge alterations lacks the requisite probative value necessary for 
admission into evidence. 
Suppose there are two cooperating witnesses that provide 
conflicting testimonies. One witness testifies in exchange for the 
reduction of a mandatory minimum 25-year sentence, whereas the 
other witness hopes to avoid a mandatory maximum 5-year sentence. 
The first witness, who knows that he certainly faces 25 years behind 
bars, clearly has a stronger incentive to ensure his testimony “pleases” 
the prosecutor. Conversely, the other witness knows that he will 
probably receive even less than the maximum 5-year sentence, and 
might be less likely to lie as a result.249 Assuming both witnesses are 
credible in all other respects, how can the jury determine which 
testimony to afford more weight? Clearly, such information directly 
speaks to motive, bias, and prejudice.250 
 
 246. Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Eleventh Circuit Pattern 
Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) (2016), http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court
docs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstructions2016Rev.pdf. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968). 
 249. See United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that mandatory 
minimum sentences lack minimum force because defendants “seldom” receive the maximum 
sentence permissible). 
 250. This is not to suggest that witnesses’ sentences or punishments directly correlate with their 
truthfulness on the stand. Detailed information about cooperation agreements should be used in 
conjunction with a juror’s “common sense” and “everyday experience,” as well as other indicators 
of credibility, including the witness’s memory, demeanor, and consistency of the testimony. See 
United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “common sense” dictates 
that a witness has a lot to lose if his cooperation agreement fails, and thus, his incentive to stretch 
the truth may significantly increase. 
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The risk posed by prohibiting the admission of such evidence is 
even more elevated when the conflicting testimonies are those of the 
defendant and the cooperating accomplice. Brown v. Powell251 is 
illustrative. There, the defendant, Brown, and the prosecution’s main 
witness, Warner, were involved in the murder of Watson.252 
According to Brown, the two visited Watson in his apartment.253 
When an argument ensued between Watson and Warner, Brown 
interfered.254 Watson hit Brown, and in response, Brown struck 
Watson on the head “several times.”255 Warner and Brown then 
dragged Watson to his car, placed him in the trunk, drove him to a 
nearby river, and threw his body into the river.256 At this point Watson 
was still alive, but he later drowned.257 Brown was ultimately charged 
with first-degree murder and Warner was charged with accomplice to 
first-degree murder, which carries the same sentence.258 Pursuant to a 
cooperation agreement, Warner pleaded guilty to manslaughter and 
accepted a 15 to 30-year maximum prison sentence.259 
At trial, “Warner testified that he never fought with Watson.”260 
Brown repudiated his police statement and stated that “because he 
feared Warner, he had falsely told the police that he, not Warner, was 
the chief offender.”261 Thus, their testimonies became directly 
conflicting. On cross-examination, Warner admitted that he currently 
faced a 15 to 30-year maximum sentence for manslaughter, and that 
he knowingly avoided a first-degree charge.262 The trial court, 
however, did not allow defense counsel to ask Warner what penalty 
first-degree murder entailed.263 The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, finding that the jury was presented with “ample evidence” 
to assess Warner’s credibility.264 
 
 251. 975 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 252. Id. at 2–3. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 2–3. 
 258. Id. at 3. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 6. 
 262. Id. at 4. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 5–6. 
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While the jury was presented extensive evidence alluding to 
Warner’s possible biases, the trial judge struck evidence that arguably 
“mattered most.”265 The fact that Warner’s alternative to the 
manslaughter charge was life in prison without parole could have 
alerted the jury to the possibility that Warner’s testimony was 
untruthful, and that he shifted all of the blame onto Brown. 
Brown and its progeny demonstrate that evidence of cooperating 
witnesses’ sentence reductions or charge alterations carries probative 
value insofar as it assists the jury in performing its dual function. 
Limiting this inquiry paints an incomplete picture and restricts the 
jury’s ability to perform its communitarian function and assess witness 
credibility and bias. More importantly, preventing the jury from 
obtaining full disclosure of a witness’s cooperation agreement 
severely thwarts its democratic function. This is especially concerning 
given that prosecutors choose their witnesses carefully and 
strategically, and that plea deals are subject to withdrawal by the 
prosecutor. A jury cannot act as a check on the prosecutor’s abusive 
practices without a complete understanding of those practices. In fact, 
in Hoffa v. United States266 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the use of cooperating witnesses in large part 
because it found the jury and cross-examination are “established 
safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system” and shields against 
the practice’s many shortcomings.267 
Finally, to the extent that a jury might nullify upon learning this 
information, nullification in that context is perhaps essential in 
fulfilling the jury’s democratic function. Considering the broad 
discretion that police and prosecutors have in pressing charges and 
recruiting witnesses and the “very little review” their discretion 
undergoes, nullification may “weed out inappropriate prosecutions 
where police and prosecutors failed to do so.”268 Thus, in almost all 
circumstances, the threat of jury nullification posed by detailed 
information about cooperation agreements is substantially outweighed 
by its probative value. 
 
 
 265. Id. at 7. 
 266. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 267. Id. at 311. 
 268. See McKnight, supra note 228, at 1127. 
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C.  The Van Arsdall Test and the Unconstitutionality of the Majority 
View 
The test articulated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall provides strong 
support to the minority view that limiting cross-examination about 
cooperation agreements is a violation of the supreme right of 
confrontation.269 As demonstrated supra, extensive cross-examination 
about cooperation agreements is “otherwise appropriate”270 insofar as 
the risk for jury nullification is outweighed by its probative value and 
falls within the permissible scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 611.271 
The minor risks that such cross-examination poses “must fall before 
the right of [a criminal defendant] to seek out the truth in the process 
of defending himself.”272 
In addition, cooperating witness testimony contains a 
“prototypical form of bias”273 since it is precisely this type of witness 
that presents a risk of providing untruthful testimony.274 Finally, by 
limiting such cross-examination, courts prevent defendants from 
“expos[ing] to the jury the facts from which” juries may assess the 
“reliability of the witness.”275 Thus, cross-examination of government 
witnesses with respect to their cooperation agreements certainly falls 
within the “constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry” that 
must be “afforded [to a] defendant.”276 
VI.  PROPOSAL 
“[T]he right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in 
which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails.”277 
Courts should establish a uniform rule that allows defendants to 
comprehensively cross-examine government witnesses about their 
cooperation agreements; specifically, defendants should be permitted 
to inquire about the precise sentences and/or charges that witnesses 
avoided or hoped to avoid by cooperating with the government. Such 
 
 269. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). 
 270. See id. 
 271. FED. R. EVID. 611 (“Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility.”). 
 272. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). 
 273. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. 
 274. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 70. 
 275. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. 
 276. See Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (Pollak, J., dissenting). 
 277. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986). 
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a rule will create consistency in criminal trials across the nation and 
afford defendants “so vital a constitutional right [to expose the] . . . 
bias of an adverse witness.”278 Exposing the bias of cooperating 
witnesses will be beneficial for the jury in determining what weight to 
afford witness testimony in the process of deciding a defendant’s guilt 
or innocence. 
A uniform rule will also safeguard defendants from prosecutors’ 
autonomous powers in charging and securing cooperation agreements. 
It is undisputable that the government has the upper hand in obtaining 
witnesses. In fact, defendants, unlike the government, are not able to 
secure a cooperation deal in exchange for testimony.279 This rule 
would balance the playing field. Defendants would be able to expose 
any relevant information that may alert the jury of overreaching by 
prosecutors and “assur[e] that individuals whose conduct is unlawful, 
yet less than fully blameworthy, do not get punished unjustly.”280 In 
addition, if prosecutors know that cooperation agreements will 
undergo scrutiny from the jury, they would likely exercise more 
caution and fairness in the process of obtaining cooperating witnesses. 
Hence, the gains from establishing a uniform rule heavily outweigh 
any of its possible shortcomings. 
To offset the concern that juries might confuse the issues or 
nullify, courts should provide limiting jury instructions. These 
instructions should inform jurors that such information should be used 
solely for the purpose of evaluating credibility, bias, and prejudice. 
Judges might also mandate that jurors avoid presuming a defendant’s 
sentence based upon the information they learn about a witness’s 
agreement. Finally, jurors should be reminded that it is the defendant 
who is on trial, not the cooperating witness. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
There is a split among the U.S. circuit courts regarding the 
permissible scope of cross-examination with respect to government 
witnesses.281 The majority view is that defendants should not be 
permitted to cross-examine cooperating witnesses about the precise 
 
 278. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). 
 279. NATAPOFF, supra note 97, at 49. 
 280. Sauer, supra note 242, at 1255 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 308 (1971)). 
 281. See United States v. Dimora, 843 F. Supp. 2d 799, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
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benefits they hope to gain in exchange for testifying.282 The minority 
view is that preventing defendants from inquiring about the details of 
cooperation agreements violates their Sixth Amendment confrontation 
rights.283 
This Note argues that in addition to a constitutional violation, 
such prohibition distorts the function of the jury, and gives more 
discretion to the prosecutor. This Note also proposes establishing a 
uniform rule: defendants must be given the full opportunity to cross-
examine government witnesses about their cooperation agreements. 
Limiting jury instructions should be provided to address any potential 
concerns that this rule would raise. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will 
resolve this issue accordingly in its upcoming terms. 
 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
